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ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the emergence of a new area of study, known 
as economics of information security, by describing the initial 
work in this field.  The article notes that economics of information 
security utilizes technical, business, policy, and applied 
perspectives, and workshops focused on economics of information 
security facilitated the coordination of work in this area of study.  
Next, the article provides an overview of a selection of the work in 
economics of information security’s major areas of inquiry, which 
include: the role of insurance, the optimal construction of a market 
for vulnerabilities, the strategic role of security in the firm, the 
economics of privacy, the role of individual incentives, and the 
economics of digital rights management.  Finally, this article 
introduces four of the current contributions to the field of 
economics of information security, which appear in this I/S issue 
on cybersecurity.   
INTRODUCTION  
 This inaugural I/S symposium on cybersecurity policy helps to 
mark the increasing maturation of “Economics of Information 
Security’’ as an emerging area of study. The economics of information 
security, an explicit combination of primary disciplines, is cross-
disciplinary as much as interdisciplinary. This overview is intended to 
provide a snapshot of the field as it stands and to identify a number of 
the critical questions likely to occupy researchers in the near term. 
 Economics of information security was initiated in a nearly 
simultaneous and completely uncoordinated manner at four 
institutions.  In 2000, scientists at the Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon proposed an early mechanism for 
risk assessment.  The Hierarchical Holographic Model provided the 
first multifaceted evaluation tool to guide security investments using 
the science of risk. [21]  Since that time, CERT has developed, under 
the name OCTAVE, a suite of systematic mechanisms for 
organizations to use in risk evaluations, depending on the size and 
expertise of the organization. 
 Shortly before this, Catherine Wolfram and I [8], from Harvard’s 
Department of Economics and School of Government, respectively, 
had published an article employing careful economic definitions to 
define the specific “good” that is now widely considered the medium 
of exchange in the various theoretical constructions of security 
markets.  Vulnerabilities were defined in this work as tradable 
externalities.  Today, the market in vulnerabilities is quite real, with 
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the purchase of a zero-day exploit by 3Com from an anonymous 
hacker in October 2005. [11]  The normal count of days is from 
announcement of a vulnerability to exploit.  A zero-day exploit is a 
vulnerability that has not yet been recorded as having been used in an 
attack.  Microsoft claims to have discovered another zero-day exploit. 
[33] 
 In 2001, Ross Anderson of Cambridge published, “Why 
Information Security is Hard: An Economic Perspective,” [2] at the 
Cambridge University Computer Laboratory.  Professor Anderson 
explained that a significant difficulty in the optimal development of 
security technology is the imperative to integrate economic 
implications into technical designs.  But, if a security technology 
requires that the party with the least risk make the greatest investment, 
then that system will fail to be widely adopted. 
 Also in 2001, Larry Gordon and Marty Loeb published a 
framework on “Using Information Security as a Response to 
Competitor Analysis Systems.” [15]  These professors at the 
University of Maryland’s Smith School of Business examined the 
strategic use of security information from a classical business 
perspective.  
 A fifth notable work appeared in the business press, authored by 
the widely respected Dan Geer. [13]  From his position as a recipient 
of privileged information on business investments at stake, he 
developed an argument for security investment to be measured not 
strictly by technical measures such as hardening or a simple count of 
dollars invested, but through a systematic Return on Security 
Investment Analysis.  
 These works together laid the foundation for an investigation of 
the economics of information security from technical, business, policy, 
and applied perspectives.  The variety of schools and researchers 
engaged from these serendipitous beginnings has steadily expanded. 
EMERGENCE OF ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY  
 The disconnected but harmonious work published by 2001 
indicated the potential of a new arena of intellectual endeavor, which 
might genuinely inform policy. Yet four articles do not make a body 
of knowledge. Bringing economics to bear upon the pressing questions 
of securing the commercial, academic, public, and personal networks 
that connect to form the national infrastructure required a more 
coordinated approach.  
 Ross Anderson and Hal Varian spearheaded the needed 
coordination by convening the Inaugural Workshop on the Economics 
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of Information Security in at the University of California-Berkeley in 
2002.  These professors accompanied their invitations to the authors of 
all the previously mentioned work with an open call for papers.  The 
inaugural workshop organized the discrete investigations into a set of 
core inquiries:  
• The role of insurance;  
• The construction of a market for vulnerabilities; 
• The strategic role of security in the firm, including 
investments and disclosures;  
• The economics of privacy as distinct from security;  
• The individual role, as distinct from the national or 
firm; and  
• The economics of digital rights management. 
 The major discovery of the first workshop was the variety of 
approaches and the wealth of current, but previously unorganized 
research.  From Harvard, Stuart Schechter developed an innovative 
metric: the cost to break into a system.  The cost to break, as opposed 
to classical risk analysis, provides a quantifiable measure of 
improvement in order to evaluate the Return on Security Investment 
Analysis. [13]  From Maryland, Gordon illustrated that information 
sharing organizations are valuable, even in the case when some 
participants provide dishonest or incomplete information. [17]  His 
focus was on the analysis of Information Sharing Analysis Centers 
(ISACs).  
 The contributions of the first, second, and third workshops were 
filtered and compiled into a single edited text, Economics of 
Information Security. [9]  All the papers that were presented at the 
inaugural conference and its successors, plus future calls for papers 
and notices can be found at http://www.infosecon.net.  
 As of 2005, there is a single narrative that leads the reader through 
the questions, methods, and findings of the economics of information 
security by Gordon and Loeb. [16]  The focus on the methodological 
exploration of security investment makes this text appropriate not only 
for a course but also for the individual seeking a guided introduction to 
the topic.  With Gordon and Loeb as a primary text, and Camp and 
Lewis as a reference text, the economics of information security has 
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reached the point where it is now a well defined academic foundation 
for coursework.  
SELECTED FINDINGS  
 There has emerged a body of common findings that are now well 
understood.  While there is continuing research, there is also a 
developing agreement with respect to the most cogent areas of 
investigation.  Of course, the market for vulnerabilities has passed 
theory, moved through research, and is now clearly instantiated.  What 
follows is an overview of the economics of information security work. 
This overview necessarily fails to include all significant works; 
otherwise this would become an annotated bibliography.  However, 
the major areas of inquiry are included.  
1.  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY?  
 Insurance is a mechanism for enforcing contributions to a shared 
good.  By requiring a minimal investment, insurance can address a 
situation where every party’s risk is a function of the lowest 
investment, and thus there is a clear economic argument that insurance 
is appropriate for security mechanisms when the reliability and 
robustness of those mechanisms depends upon the weakest link. [31]  
Security mechanisms that exhibit this behavior include authentication 
systems based on shared information and denial of service attacks, 
where one firm can be attacked because of the existence of a network 
of subverted machines.  
 Insurance has now taken a significant role as an incentive for 
investment in security, with Lloyd’s of London offering the first 
specific information security policy in 2003.  Network security 
policies are also embedded in more traditional loss policies.  
Requirements for backup facilities and recovery plans as elements of 
disaster recovery policies enable organizations to better respond to 
electronic disasters.  Counterpane Internet Security, for example, 
currently evaluates a commercial firm to provide metrics to determine 
if the firm is risk-seeking or has invested rationally in security.  Before 
this practice became commonplace, the founder of Counterpane 
Internet Security, Bruce Schneier, presented a mechanism for 
developing such metrics [29] and illustrative cases where the lack of 
incentive for one firm had created costs for other firms in the same 
industry.  
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2.  WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL CONSTRUCTION OF A MARKET FOR 
VULNERABILITIES?  
 The determination of vulnerabilities as a good was an important 
first intellectual foundation on which much has been built.  However, 
in terms of research, much remains to be seen about how to construct a 
security market.  
 One mechanism for ensuring security is to develop formal price 
mechanisms to guide investments.  Consider a software package. 
Initially, before a package is widely used and tested, there is a low 
bounty for vulnerabilities.  There are ever-increasing bounty amounts. 
A small bounty, perhaps $10,000 for the first person to illustrate 
vulnerability, would be an opening offer. [28]  As time passes and the 
system owner becomes more certain of security, the bounty can be 
increased.  When a vulnerability is found, the bounty resets.  
 An extension that has not been previously considered is the 
adoption of per company bonds on privacy or security policies.  For 
those nations that have strong privacy laws, there is an enforced 
commitment to their privacy policies at the risk of fines.  An 
equivalent risk could be created by posting privacy bonds, whereby 
companies that handle data are forced to pay individuals, or corporate 
customers, when data are shared in violation of a previous 
commitment if confidentiality is lost.  
 An alternative mechanism is an auction that allows a person with 
knowledge of a vulnerability to announce its existence, while others 
indicate a willingness to pay. [23]  The advantage of an auction is that 
it provides coordination for those willing to pay.  Those who would 
gain the greatest value from investing in vulnerability disclosure (i.e., 
those with the lowest cost/benefit ratio) can set their willingness to 
pay.  Bidding in this case could be organized as a multiple-good Dutch 
auction, where every party pays the price set by the first “losing” 
bidder, and the vulnerability is disclosed to those parties who pay. 
Alternatively, the auction could be a “reverse auction,” which would 
provide the vulnerability to those parties who value the knowledge 
more than the threshold set by the discovering party.  In either case, 
the party that identifies vulnerabilities would be paid at least as much 
as in any single purchaser case, and no company would pay more than 
the value of the vulnerability to the company.  
 Of course the value of an auction, in coordinating those at risk, 
requires the underlying coordination and information of the auction 
itself.  Thus, what the market now sees are not auctions, but vendors. 
The purchasers of vulnerabilities are not producers of software, but the 
sellers of security services.  Security vendors who pay for 
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vulnerabilities have perverse incentives.  A vendor who purchases 
vulnerabilities for its own subscribers or participants has no reason to 
maintain the confidentiality of that vulnerability.  Once protected, the 
individuals who pay for the vulnerability have an incentive to leak 
information to illustrate the value of their service. [5]  
 A second more detailed analysis of the study of software 
vulnerabilities looks at the result of these perverse motivations of 
individuals and firms using repeated interactions (i.e., game theory). 
Formal disclosure of vulnerabilities, even those that are known in the 
community, increases their use.  Thus, there is a possible argument 
that not spreading formal information about vulnerabilities may be 
best.  White hats create a negative externality for black hats (i.e., they 
make the bad guys work harder).  Currently, excluding the firm 
Tipping Point, there is only reputation capital for compensation for 
white hats who would expose vulnerabilities.  White hats who sell 
vulnerabilities to a single vendor lose some reputation capital.  
Markets will increase the incentive to investigate but will also increase 
exposure.  The optimal market would be one where there was a single 
purchaser who excludes no party from the information.  This suggests 
direct governmental participation as a purchaser and distributor of 
vulnerability information, perhaps through an incident response team 
or ISAC. [19]  
 A study of a set of honeypots, including Linux and Windows, 
illustrates that formal disclosure of vulnerabilities, even those that are 
known in the community, increases their use. 
 
Formal disclosure 
increased the use of an informally known vulnerability by .26 attacks 
per day (e.g., one roughly every four days per machine) on average. 
Simultaneous publication and patching increases the observed 
attempts at subversion using the announced vulnerability by 0.02 
attacks a day (or one attack every fifty days on one machine).  The 
number of attacks per day is a per machine average, as the honeypot 
had multiple machines. [4] 
3.  WHAT IS THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF SECURITY IN THE FIRM?  
 A firm's investment security is obviously a function of its risk, 
defined as the product of the loss that would be created if there were a 
compromise and the probability of the compromise occurring.  More 
detailed modeling [14] illustrates that the optimal investment depends 
very much upon the probability function, not simply the absolute 
probability.  In fact, the shape of the probability function may result in 
investments ranging from nothing to nearly 40 per cent of the potential 
loss.  This finding underlies the importance of collecting a range of 
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comprehensive data about incidents and network activity, as 
enumerated by Shari Pfleeger. [24]  
 There are risks to investing in security to the extent that investment 
includes information sharing.  The risk of possible losses in consumer 
trust and reputation discourages firms from sharing security 
information.  Yet further research has verified that information sharing 
is both economically valuable and a complement to security 
investment.  This research into information sharing has shown that 
information sharing is most valuable in highly competitive markets, 
because it counters downward pressures on pricing. [12]  
 There are also immediate costs to a firm that suffers a loss of 
information integrity.  In addition to the long-term loss of reputation, a 
security incident is associated with immediate loss of value.  A study 
of capital market valuation and announced incidents found that a firm 
loses more than two percent of its market value within two days of a 
publicized incident.  Notice that this documented capitalization loss 
for firms with announced vulnerabilities yields a total loss that is 
greater than that reported by the annual FBI survey on cybercrime. 
This carefully calculated finding suggests that, far from security 
hysteria, there is still a widespread lack of security concern. [10]  
 In contrast, an examination of computer security from the 
perspective of insurance suggests that current practices may be 
reasonable.  Either there is overinvestment, in which there are no 
incidents, or there is underinvestment, in which case there are 
incidents.  Effectively, an insurance model suggests responding to the 
level of risk, implying that the current reactive practices are 
reasonable.  If the risks are distributed as typical insurance risk (flood 
insurance in New Mexico?  Hurricane insurance in Indiana?) then 
underinvestment before an incident is reasonable.  However, this 
finding depends very much upon the relationship between past trends 
and current risk. [14]  Lack of tornadoes in New York state indicates 
no tornadoes in New York state; never having been hacked may 
simply indicate a considerable run of luck.  The distribution of risk is a 
critical unknown in cyber-insurance. 
4.  WHAT ARE THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY?  
 Why is it that the same individuals who express concerns about 
privacy will behave in a manner that systematically exposes their 
information?  Economics offers a set of sometimes subtle answers.  
 First, the privacy market does not have adequate signals.
 
 At the 
most fundamental level, “protecting privacy” is a vague promise.  For 
example, the privacy-enhancing technology market boom of the 
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nineties included privacy protection that ranged from Zero 
Knowledge’s provably secure and private email to Microsoft 
Passport's concentration of information in one (insecure) location. [7]  
 Even when privacy can be defined and specified, for example, 
through machine-readable P3P policies, a signaling problem remains. 
This signaling problem has been described in formal mathematical 
terms, and illustrates that the market for privacy cannot function 
without an external forcing function.  The model of a market with 
fluctuating numbers of reliable privacy-respecting merchants will not 
necessarily reach an equilibrium where it is efficient for consumers to 
read privacy policies.  As the cost of investigating the privacy policy 
changes, merchants that (dis)respect their own policies enter the 
market, the reliability of what is read varies, and there is no stable self-
reinforcing equilibrium under which consumers should read privacy 
policies.  Direct incentives are required to protect privacy.  The market 
by itself will not reach an equilibrium where privacy policies are 
readable, read, and reliable as long as there are firms that can 
prevaricate about privacy. [32]  
 Beginning with an examination of the marketplace as a whole, not 
simply the digital marketplace, an argument can be made that there is 
a strong market for privacy.  Products from simple window shades 
(with unarguably limited aesthetic appeal) to locking mailboxes thrive 
in the physical realm.  Observing the physical and virtual markets for 
products providing unobservability, Shostack and Syverson conclude 
that, “when privacy is offered in a clear and comprehensible manner, it 
sells.” [30]  The argument is supported by the documentation of a 
range of sources of possible privacy products, from curtains to 
cryptography, which demonstrate the scale of these markets.  
 The understanding of privacy information as unreliable, and the 
market for privacy information as flawed, provides an important 
element to understanding user behavior.  Individuals react in an 
understandable manner when information about privacy protection is 
ill-defined, untrustworthy, or even invisible.  Signals in the privacy 
market are rejected when they are no more enlightening than the left 
turn blinker of a speeding octogenarian.  
 Alternatively, end user behavior can be categorized as simply 
discounting privacy risks.  Individuals may share information, be 
aware of the risks, and simply discount those risks.  Individual risk 
behaviors in other contexts are well documented and irrational. 
Privacy has none of the characteristics that generate horror, which 
would make the risks seem high, and the ubiquity of information 
sharing has made the risk too commonplace to create tension. [6]  The 
calculus of computer security risk enabled by the CERT OCTAVE 
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methodology is unquestionably beyond the limits of most computer 
users, and security is arguably a subset of the question of privacy.  
 Data compiled from privacy behaviors suggest that whatever the 
risks and whatever the reason, the risks of privacy are in fact 
discounted in consumer decision-making.  In fact, individuals not only 
immediately discount privacy risk, but they increase their discount rate 
over time. [1]  This is particularly interesting considering the rapid rate 
of increase in identity theft that suggests that risks increase over time.  
5.  WHAT IS THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES?  
 The previous work assumes that privacy is good for individuals 
and good in some cases for firms.  Yet, the information market is not 
always a zero-sum game in which gains from the consumer are offset 
by loses for the firm.  Sharing information that is good for one party 
may not be in the interest of the other party.  Privacy can be good for 
individuals or bad, e.g., when the information obtained by others is 
used to lower prices or to extend privileges.  In particular, the opposite 
of privacy in the market is not necessarily information; the opposite of 
privacy is price discrimination.  In markets where there is zero 
marginal cost (e.g., information markets) firms must be able to extract 
consumer surplus by price discrimination.  This means that the firms 
cannot charge what they pay, at the margin, but must charge what the 
consumer is willing to pay.  Data the consumer considers to be privacy 
violations may be necessary pricing data to the merchant. [22]  
 Experiments on the willingness of individuals to share data show 
that the farther someone is from the average, the more that person 
wants to protect their privacy. [18]  That is, if a person’s weight, 
salary, or age is close to the mean in a group, that person would not 
ask for much money for disclosure.  But if a person’s weight, salary, 
or age are far from the mean, then that person would demand more 
money for disclosure.  This finding was based on experimental 
psychology.  However, information theory predicates that the further 
data are from the mean, the more the data have the potential to reduce 
uncertainty.  Therefore, the two sets of insights together argue that 
individuals, when empowered, rationally price information.  Indeed, 
further empirical work [34] indicates that users are quite sensitive to 
the implications of further sharing of data and data type, so this 
sensitivity to the mean may not be generalizable. 
 Individual rejection of security information may itself be rational.  
When information security means ensuring that the end user has no 
place to hide his or her own information, or when security is 
implemented to exert detailed control over employees, individuals 
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rightly seek to subvert the control.  Security is often built with 
perverse incentives.  Privacy and security are constructed to be 
opposites instead of complements in controlling information. 
Rejection of security is, in some cases, strictly rational. [26]  
ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT  
 The most direct and obvious point of opposition between 
consumers and producers of computer security occurs in the 
implementation of Digital Rights Management (DRM).  DRM 
implements business plans and strategies in information goods.  Thus, 
the economics of DRM is a specialized arena of significant 
importance. 
 The initial study indicated the cynic’s worst fear, which is that 
security as implemented in DRM is in opposition to security in terms 
of the owner and operator of the machine.  DRM limits user options 
and competition, while not contributing to the security of machines. 
[3]  Examples include tying batteries to phones and cartridges to 
printers.  To the extent that security promotes survivability and the 
capacity to function in the face of attack, DRM is in opposition to 
security.  By examining the return on complementary products, the 
action of the firm in implementing such (pseudo) security can be well 
understood.  
 DRM is used when legal remedies, based on protection of 
intellectual property to prevent unfair exploitation of innovation, are 
not available.  The implementation of DRM in these cases does not 
support innovation, but rather only lock-in.  Careful observation of the 
optimal investment in terms of social welfare identifies social and 
consumer costs.  Limitations on reverse engineering that serve only to 
prevent competition are counted in economic terms as wasteful. [25]  
 Content holders have invested in DRM with the hope that such 
technology will force consumers to spend more and limit consumer 
sharing of information.  Economic models illustrate that the true 
implications of DRM may not be all that the proponents hope for.  A 
simple, clear examination of the cost of DRM indicates that the 
purpose is to increase friction in the market.  Thus, providers of 
content, in order to prevent free sharing of content (also called piracy, 
depending on the speaker), increase friction in the purchase and use of 
goods.  Yet, the option of free downloads remains, despite lawsuits 
and technologies.  Observations of other markets, for example, in 
software, illustrate that the only way to compete with free availability 
is to increase service and reduce friction.  Every expenditure in DRM 
that results in a reduced service or increased friction is an investment 
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that will drive users to free, illegal but usable alternatives. [20] 
Examining DRM in the larger economic context, rather than focusing 
on the narrow potential of enforcing a particular license post-purchase, 
illustrates the risks to producers of DRM.  
 In fact, trusted computing is often considered the DRM Holy Grail.
  
An economic analysis suggests that trusted computing arguably will 
help those who illegally upload information more than those who 
would prevent free information sharing.  Current efforts against large-
scale illegal copying on peer-to-peer networks depends on being able 
to prosecute by (in technical terms) violating the confidentiality of the 
users.  Trusted computing would create an environment where peer-to-
peer systems provide confidentiality to those who upload files, as well 
as integrity of content.  Therefore, in a network characterized by 
trusted computing, users of peer-to-peer systems would be better off 
while those attempting to hold them legally accountable would be 
prevented from identifying those uploading files. [27]  
 In summary, the economics of DRM have illustrated that the 
incentives of DRM technology may be perverse, and thus, the results 
are not in the interest of those who support DRM.  
CONCLUSIONS  
 Sony Corporation added DRM in its music compact discs 
allegedly to prevent illegal copying, implicitly validating observations 
about the economic waste in DRM.  In fact, the copy protection 
software took the form of malicious software, a root kit that installed 
regardless of the user's selections in the installation dialogue.  By 
virtue of installation at the most fundamental authentication level, the 
root, the toolkit has in many cases more authority than the CD listener.  
This DRM radically reduced the consumers’ ability to secure their 
own machines, thus confirming the arguments that users are right to 
avoid some instances of security.  The DRM also sent information 
back to the Sony Corporation advertising bureau, to enable price 
discrimination and targeting of advertising to consumers despite the 
stated privacy policy, thereby confirming both the relationship to 
privacy and price discrimination, and the near-zero value of stated 
privacy policies.  The Sony DRM root kit is a disaster in security 
terms, but a disaster that was completely predictable and perfectly 
explicable in terms of economics of security.  Those studying the 
economics of information security were less than shocked to discover 
the nakedness of that particular emperor. 
 Economics of information security has the potential to inform 
privacy and security-related initiatives, such as DRM, from policy and 
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economics perspectives.  Following its now-confirmed tradition of 
crossdisciplinary publication, economics of information security is 
unified as an intellectual endeavor by a series of workshops.  The best 
papers from these workshops develop into journal special issues and 
texts, such as the special issue you now read (and may even hold in 
physical instantiation).  
 The work by Granick was first presented at the Fourth Workshop 
on the Economics of Information Security at Harvard University. 
Granick shows that the current legal construction of computer crime 
does not provide either clear incentives to invest in security or 
disincentives to commit computer crime.  In computer crime, the cost 
to the victim of the crime is determined by the victim of the crime both 
before and after the incident.  Companies that are ill-prepared even to 
the point of negligence can point to all their response costs, even those 
created by their own processes, as caused by an intrusion.  For 
example, a company that fails to have even a trivial firewall can point 
to the post-incident purchase of a firewall as a cost of intrusion, as 
opposed to being held negligent to the point of creating an attractive 
hazard.  Companies that overrespond to the point of paranoia can 
similarly run up costs and thus the putative harm of the crime.  The 
law arguably protects at least those organizations that are the most 
prepared before an event and are the most professional in response.  
The punishments, as currently defined, may fit neither crime nor 
criminal.  The incentives under the law are perverse, and the market 
cannot reverse those incentives.  
 The work by Rowe addresses IPv6 adoption in the United States, 
which has the greatest wealth of IP addresses, and can generously be 
described as glacial.  The failure to adopt IPv6 is a refusal to invest, 
and a refusal to coordinate.  After all, buying IPv6 increases the 
difficulty of using a domain as a platform to attack others, but it does 
little to prevent attacks.  The failure of IPv6 adoption is a security 
failure that can only be understood in economic terms. 
 The work by Sand illustrates that the organization that integrates 
privacy with daily practice obtains the most value.  A preliminary 
version of this work was presented as a work in progress at the Fourth 
Workshop on the Economics of Security.  He identifies a dynamic of 
low investment and then expensive remediation that applies to privacy 
(as well as security).  He identifies the loss of personal privacy as also 
a worst case for business as well as the individual, because a total loss 
of privacy for the person generates a loss of control over business 
assets by the organization.  Finally, Sand provides two alternative 
frameworks and a set of concerns addressed by both of those 
frameworks in order to guide system designers in integrating privacy 
into process and technology.  
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 The third fourth paper, a contribution led by Nathan Good, is the 
first examination of installation interfaces of software consisting of or 
containing spyware.  This investigation builds upon the observations 
about signaling and information flow in the market for privacy and 
security.  The fundamental question of the adequacy of informing 
users upon installation is addressed in a series of carefully designed 
usability tests.  The finding is that mutual assent, given the state of law 
and computer interaction design, is not meaningfully achievable.  
However, the study did find that while individuals may not alter their 
behavior when notified of security and privacy risks, individuals 
nonetheless obtain a better emotional state postinstallation when 
provided such notification.  The combination of incentive modeling, 
legal studies, and experimentation in this work both informs the 
reader, and illustrates that the study of economics of security has much 
to contribute.  
 In six years, the economics of information security has evolved 
from a disparate idea of disconnected scholars to a body of inquiry 
with a set of open questions, methods, and findings sufficiently 
examined as a means to begin to inform policy.  
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